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Summary
•	 A better understanding of ‘local’ agreements vis-a-vis national state-building processes is a 
strong current in policy and academic circles, with Somalia acknowledged as a context with 
a rich history in such processes. 
•	 The 2017 Galkaio agreement is a landmark achievement in this history, and one that is located 
within the recent formation of the Federal system in Somalia. It successfully combined Somali 
and international actors and resources. As such, it is an important example of an appropriate 
external intervention.
•	 The Galkaio agreement-making process took place over 2-3 years, required sensitivity to both 
the national and local contexts and included a strong Somali identity among the international 
actors.
•	 This briefing discusses the blurred boundaries between organisational and personal identities, 
where, for example, a key individual in this case was able to leverage her multiple identities 
(in terms of gender, clan, diaspora, UN employee) with skill and sensitivity, in order to support 
and participate in networks pursuing peaceful outcomes. 
•	 The agreement represents the re-establishment of social relations across a significant border 
area, a process which is still ongoing, and which remains fragile and unfinished. This social 
rebuilding process is qualitatively different than the 1993 Mudug Accord that characterised 
the pre-existing boundary. 
•	 The international engagement, as embodied by a number of the key mediators working for 
international agencies, represented an activist approach to peacebuilding that was arguably 
sufficiently powerful to counter underlying grievances and the transactional elite-driven 
politics that dominates Somalia’s political marketplace.
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Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, structural shifts in the global landscape of conflict and peace-making have 
necessitated a review of dominant approaches to managing and resolving violent conflict. Today’s armed 
conflicts are characterized by complexity, the proliferation and fragmentation of actors, the mixture of 
political and criminal violence, intensified geopolitical and regional involvement, and the presence of 
ideological and identity-based conflict. These factors challenge linear and binary approaches to conflict 
resolution, blurring traditional distinctions between ‘inter-state’ and ‘intra-state’ armed conflicts largely 
fought between two or more cohesive sides. While the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding helpfully emphasizes 
the need to engage with local actors, structures and dynamics, there remains a tendency to treat the 
‘local’ as a bounded category and to overlook how local, national and global actors, processes and forces 
interact to shape and sustain intractable conflicts. Today, understanding how these levels interact and 
how to design a multi-dimensional approach, is increasingly becoming an urgent challenge for political 
and diplomatic interventions. 
Somalia provides a rich history in peace-making at multiple levels. Since the collapse of the state in 
1991, there have been several national reconciliation conferences as well as un-counted numbers of sub-
national peace processes; the establishment of Somaliland and Puntland being particularly notable. A 
number of these processes have been analysed, documented, and compared.1
This policy brief is drawn from a longer paper based on original research in the areas that examines the 
Galkaio agreement, signed in December 2017, and which was located within the current and still nascent 
state-building context in Somalia.2 It focuses on the role that external mediators played in supporting the 
process, with the aim of contributing to the evidence-base on understanding, mediating and supporting 
local-level agreements. It offers insight into the relationship between local and national levels and the 
various strategies that external mediators employed to reach an agreement to end violence and create the 
conditions for local-level peacebuilding. While the Galkaio agreement has received little public attention, it 
can be considered a major success story in Somalia’s social and political history both from a processual 
and content perspective, and stands in somewhat of a contrast with the political bargain that created the 
current federal system and the political marketplace that characterises much of elite politics in Somalia. 
Background 
Galkaio town and the surrounding areas are located in the central rangelands of Somalia and are associated 
with a pastoral culture and history where several clans live in relatively close proximity.3  Competition for 
territory and resources, including pasture and water, intersect with long-standing grievances and (re-)
emerging state structures. Galkaio town marks a border at multiple levels, including between two of the 
four major Somali clan families, the Darod and the Hawiye.  In the early 1990s, two of the main military 
insurgent groups, the USC (United Somali Congress) and SSDF (Somali Salvation and Democratic Front), 
who first fought against the Siad Barre regime and then against each other, agreed to a cessation of 
hostilities, which became known as the 1993 Mudug (Peace) Accord.  This Accord effectively divided 
northern Somalia from the centre and south, enabling the area now known as Puntland to pursue a 
reconciliation process which concluded with its inauguration in 1998. 
The remarkable longevity of the Mudug Accord along this border mitigated the threat of large-scale 
conflict for over 20 years. The Accord can be best characterised as a truce or ceasefire as it did not 
involve a deeper reconciliation process between the divided communities.  The border involved a physical 
barrier with guarded checkpoints but is also imbued with social and psychological dimensions, reflecting 
the troubled history of the area and its unreconciled character, which continues to be animated by public 
and social media. While trade continued across the border, other forms of social interaction, such as 
inter-marriage and everyday social intercourse, have not been taking place. 
1  Bradbury, M. The Search for Peace: A Synthesis Report of the Peace Mapping Study, Interpeace, 2009; Bradbury, M. and Healy, S., 
Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking, Issue21. Accord, Conciliation Resources in collaboration with 
Interpeace, 2010; Centre for Research and Dialogue/Interpeace, Dialogue Not Guns, 2006’; Interpeace/Centre for Research and Dialogue, 
Community-based Peace Processes in South-Central Somalia, 2008; Interpeace and PDRC, The Puntland Experience: A Bottom-up Approach to 
Peace and State Building, 2008: Peace Initiatives in Puntland 1991-2007, 2008; Interpeace and CRD, A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988, 
2008.
2  The study included interviews in Nairobi, Mogadishu and Galkaio, with a range of key informants, including elders, staff and ex-staff 
of government and organisations involved in supporting and mediating the Galkaio agreement. In particular, the research involved multiple in-
depth discussions with one of the key mediators, Ms Ilham Gassar, a ‘diaspora’ Somali woman working at the office of the SRSG who is widely 
recognised to have played an instrumental role at both the national and local levels. 
3  Population estimates for Galkaio very between 75,000 and 315,000; The Majerteen, Habar Gidir and Marehan are the main local clans, 
with Dir and Lelkasse clans also significant local actors.
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A key underlying tension that developed over the last 20 years in Galkaio town has been the uneven 
pace and level of development on either side of the border. In the northern (Puntland) area of Galkaio, 
considerable diaspora and business investment has taken place while the more turbulent southern 
Galkaio has seen little investment as wealthier populations from the town have invested in Mogadishu 
instead. This unevenness has been replicated and exacerbated by the unequal presence and distribution 
of resources by the international aid sector, which has favoured north Galkaio due to its greater security 
and infrastructure. This imbalance was a catalyst in the two major outbreaks of violence during the period 
in question and reflects the problematic incorporation of aid and its multiple resources into Somalia’s 
political economy.  
The recurrent conflict and agreement-making context in and around Galkaio took place between 2014 
and 2017 and coincides with the emergence of the Federal system in Somalia. This political arrangement 
required the creation of new Federal Member States; Galmudug was therefore constituted as an 
amalgamation of Galgadud and southern Mudug regions, while Puntland was fully incorporated into the 
new Federal system.4 
The agreement to form and recognise Galmudug immediately provoked an antagonistic response 
from the Puntland leadership, who removed their MPs from Parliament in Mogadishu. One of the major 
underlying rationales for this reaction was that the incumbent President of Puntland, Abdiwali Gaas (and 
his allies), feared that the close relationship between Somalia’s national President, Hassan Sheikh, and the 
first Galmudug President, Abdikarim Guled might influence the next Federal election, due in early 2017.  
Such tensions between central and regional actors include a recognition that Somalia’s political elite act 
within a political marketplace that involves competition and movement between regional and national 
levels. On the Galmudug side, tensions were in part driven by Galmudug politicians attempting to assert 
their new political identity and statehood, and where only fragmented clan-based entities had previously 
existed. 
Elite-level tensions led to military confrontations in Galkaio town and fuelled underlying grievances. Major 
outbreaks of conflict took place in November 2015 and October 2016, with many deaths and large-
scale displacement. Underlying tensions, including revenge killings, media hate speech and an emerging 
smuggling economy continued while ceasefires negotiated in December 2015 and again in October 2016 
mitigated larger-scale conflict. The focus of this brief is on the process from October 2016 which marked 
a renewed effort at reconciliation leading to the signing of the Galkaio Agreement in December 2017. The 
period in which the substantive agreement process took place began with another major violent incident 
that prompted the involvement of the office of the UN Special Representative to the Secretary General 
(SRSG) and Interpeace. 
Support and engaging in agreement-making
The study identified a number of different themes, which are explored in more detail in the longer paper/s. 
•	 Acting at different levels 
While the Galkaio agreement-making process concerned a specific locality, the primary international 
actors involved in the process appreciated its inter-dependencies with regional and national dynamics 
and interests. An elite level agreement, signed in Mogadishu and publicised, was initially pursued in order 
to create the space for meaningful engagement with different stakeholders at the local level in Galkaio 
town.5 Throughout the process, the office of the UN SRSG coordinated and moved between local, regional 
and national levels to successfully reach an agreement.
•	 The credibility of international actors
The credibility of international actors in Somalia is deeply problematic where those actors, whether individuals 
or organisations, are typically implicated in the political economy of aid in the country and/or pursue their 
own strategic interests. In the Galkaio agreement making process, the office of the UN SRSG assembled, 
coordinated and worked with a team of Somali and international personnel that brought an understanding 
of local political dynamics and sensitivities, access at different levels, and sensitivity to their own personal 
positionality. This was particularly notable in the case of Ms Ilham Gassar who, paradoxically, did not have a 
professional history of mediation but brought considerable skill and sensitivity to her role. Complementing 
the SRSG’s office, the role of Interpeace, organisationally and through key staff, was critical and brought an 
4  Puntland was established in 1998 as part of a future Federal Somalia.
5  This agreement included a commitment to remove roadblocks, move troops/militia back to their original positions and to train a joint 
police force. Although only a verbal, informal agreement the fact that it was recorded and publicised meant that it was meaningful. 
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unparalleled weight of experience. The knowledge and commitment to the process of key individuals from 
these international actors demonstrated their credibility to local participants. 
Moreover, managing the different external actors helped increase coherence and support to a locally-
owned process.  A key concern in international engagement in peace-making is the involvement of multiple 
actors that can work at cross-purposes and confuse the mediation space.  From the start, the SRSG’s 
office helped to limit and order the aid landscape and stress its facilitatory role, enabling local actors to feel 
empowered, rather than part of an external project.
•	 Reframing the interests of spoilers 
Mediators were able to re-frame the interests of potential spoilers, turning underlying grievances into 
the creation of new opportunities and leveraging missing taxes that could be collected. One example 
provided, was that of a senior commander from the Galmudug side who had seen a group of elders 
killed in a mistaken attack – the mediators encouraged him to meet his ‘enemies’ in a foreign military 
base where he could instead build relations and help to avoid future mistaken attacks.
•	 Inclusive network building and strengthening local mechanisms
Key mediators acted as part of a core network of peacebuilders playing their part behind the scenes 
rather than at the forefront. This informal coalition included committed political elites at the local, regional 
and national levels, as well as businesspeople and prominent women and youth groups.  Moreover, they 
supported and strengthened existing mechanisms, such as the Joint Ceasefire Committee, rather than 
create parallel structures. 
Key elements of the agreement 
•	 Stopping violence and re-building trust and social relations 
The importance of meaningful reconciliation – of rebuilding social relations - has been emphasised 
in analyses of peace processes in Somalia, especially at the local level.6 A long breakdown of social 
relations and a culture of disrespect had developed between populations on either side of the border. A 
Joint Ceasefire Committee established earlier in the conflict was expanded in membership to include 
different identity groups while elders took personal responsibility to limit breaches of the emerging 
peace and obtain compensation where this did happen. 
•	 Opening up the town and toning down the language 
Enabling physical interaction and mingling was a critical component towards overcoming a long history 
of antagonistic posturing and language. Different initiatives took place to secure venues for meetings 
and events, bringing together different sets of actors from either side. A decision by political leaders to 
ban hate speech by local media was enacted. 
•	 Creating joint security forces 
The creation of joint security and joint police forces took place. The security forces were tasked to 
guarantee the safety of the Galkaio market which had been a focus of tension. These forces were 
paid by the Federal Government. A joint police force was also created with some success although it 
encountered more difficulties due in part to payment problems. 
Discussion 
This briefing (and the accompanying paper/s) does not provide a comprehensive description and 
analysis of the Galkaio agreement-making process, which involved many actors and activities, over 
several years. Instead, it adds to previous learning and documentation on Somali peace-making by 
focusing on the role that external mediators played in influencing the process and outcome in Galkaio. 
The Galkaio agreement can be considered a major success story in Somalia’s social and political 
history, both from a process and content perspective. Its inclusive approach created widespread buy-
in and involvement, with the agreement signed by a range of political, military and civil society figures, 
including prominent women in Galkaio town as well as the highest customary authority. Its content 
is more far-reaching than previous agreements and includes provisions on the norms and rules for 
dispute resolution on issues or incidences that might arise in the future as well as provisions banning 
6  Ibrahim Ali Amber “Oker” and Su’aad Ibrahim H. Habibullah, Community-based Peace Processes in South-Central Somalia, Interpeace 
and the Center for Research and Dialogue, 2008.
5
the media hate speech that exacerbated tensions. Moreover, it built on existing structures and provided 
immediate community programs to both sides in order to demonstrate the peace dividends of the 
agreement, and in part, sought to address some of the underlying inequalities that drove the conflict.  
As a consequence, it began a process where social relations across the border could be repaired and 
rebuilt, evidenced by further inter-clan agreements being forged between different clans in the area 
during 2020.  
Resolving any conflict is a dynamic process that involves a mix of subjective and objective factors 
which can change over time, creating opportunities for different strategies and interventions. For 
example, the overall process to reach an agreement in Galkaio became significantly smoother in May 
2017 when President Ahmed Gelle Haaf was elected to Galmudug.7 The Somali business community 
provided substantial resources for many of the activities, particularly for transportation and security. 
An important factor was the significant Somali and international interest and pressure to resolve the 
crisis, given the wider hope around the creation of a new Government and political system after three 
decades of its absence. As Menkhaus has observed, external mediation support in Somalia works 
when international interests are aligned with Somali interests.
External mediation approaches and strategies adopted a more peace-building orientation with the 
emphasis on facilitation, coordination and coalition-building. These approaches sought not simply to 
end violence but also to restore social relations between clans and address underlying conflict drivers 
at different levels. From the start, there was a deep appreciation of how different levels inter-related 
and interacted. The SRSG’s office – particularly through the role of Ms Ilham Gassar – understood it 
needed work at multiple levels, and first to reach a public agreement at the inter-state level to create 
space for local efforts to be supported. Experimentation with different approaches to sequencing, 
linking and moving between the multiple levels helped ensure its viability. Moreover, the UN SRSG’s 
office took a leading role to cohere external actors in support of a locally-owned process, while 
Interpeace, with a long history of engagement in this area, played a critical role in working locally and 
linking to international actors.  
In addition, political economy analyses and granular knowledge of the landscape enabled external 
actors to incentivise key stakeholders and potential spoilers, whether by facilitating access and 
networking or reframing problems as opportunities, while also building coalitions of civic-minded 
and peacebuilding-oriented individuals. The ‘activist’ approach recognised the importance of women 
activists and youth groups already playing a role in peace and bringing them in to the official process 
extended the reach of discussions from military figures to civil figures and participation. According to 
De Waal, elite politics in Somalia can be described as a political marketplace which is characterised 
by the ascendancy of personal and transactional relationships over institutional norms. Applied to the 
mediating world, this personalised environment is also important as the political entrepreneur can 
be contrasted with the civic/peace-building activists; both are acting in the same environment but 
following different agendas and norms.
Another key element was the importance of personal mediator characteristics and their relationship to 
the strategies employed and outcomes achieved. Both personnel in the SRSG’s office and Interpeace 
were deeply committed and had knowledge of local drivers of conflict and peace, and the capacity to 
network extensively with a wide range of figures across clans, from the military to civil society, and at 
elite levels and local levels. The role and history of Interpeace, with its partners, is a critical aspect to 
this story. Its engagement reflects its own history and continuity in Somalia, institutionally and with its 
leadership, staff and partners for many years. It also employed an impressive participatory research 
model that has brought together international and Somali expertise to produce significant pieces of 
work and identify lessons learned. 
At the same time, unpacking the identity of ‘external’ actors is revealing, and highlights the importance 
of personnel and staffing. Interviewees pointed out the importance of the ‘passion’ and commitment 
of those involved in the mediation process. For Ilham Gassar, for example, this was a deeply personal 
project. As a Somali diaspora woman from one side of the frontline, she occupied a different position 
than Interpeace and some of its staff. Despite her limited experience in mediation or peace-building 
processes, she brought deep commitment and considerable skills to the team. She was also attentive 
to her positionality and used her different identities - as a UN staff member, a woman, a member of 
her family and clan and as a diaspora individual - to enable progress in the process.  Leveraging these 
different identities became a key part of negotiating this environment.
7  Haaf had good relations with Puntland and was supportive of a peace process. 
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Key Recommendations
The interest in the surge of agreements being forged at local and sub-national levels is increasingly reflected 
in the development of new approaches and tools by international institutions.  The relatively new term 
‘sustaining peace’, for example, describes how the different parts of the UN should work together with 
national and local stakeholders and with the support of a wide range of partners to develop coherent and 
comprehensive responses to complex and interrelated challenges.  Our findings seek to add to efforts to 
develop new approaches and tools that can address the constantly evolving complexities of peace-making. 
While every external mediation process and conflict context has its own particularities, learning from the 
Galkaio agreement process should be more widely captured and discussed by different audiences, Somali 
and non-Somali, given its historical importance and contemporary relevance. 
We highlight several recommendations that can support external engagement in these processes. 
•	 People Matter: Many of those involved in this agreement-making process have been part of the 
institutional memory of peacebuilding in Somalia; getting the right people with the right skills and 
experience seems obvious but is often very difficult to obtain.
•	 Donor/agency coordination: where international agencies and resources can crowd out the space for 
local actors and distort incentives, coordination and agreement on ways of working is essential.
•	 An ‘activist’ or peacebuilding orientation and approach: Engendering an ‘activist’ approach to peacebuilding 
is an important counter strategy to the short-term political calculus of many actors.  Often, external 
mediators are focused on reaching a settlement or agreement, which is especially evident in national-
level processes where prestige and reputation of the mediators may be at stake. Adopting a more activist 
approach can achieve both a settlement as well as create space for a longer-term transformation of 
relations at the local level. This is particularly important when approaches consider both the incentive 
structure of different actors as well as the historical, emotional and symbolic roots of conflict, which 
involve a wide range of stakeholders.  
•	 Need for more flexible funding and risk-taking approaches: Agencies supporting mediation and 
peacebuilding efforts in insecure ‘local’ environments should develop flexible and risk-taking approaches. 
Security and bureaucratic constraints often restrict and limit the ability of mediators to work in these 
environments, diminishing both their credibility and the opportunities to progress the process.  More 
flexibility, decentralized decision-making locally, and an increased appetite for risk-taking would enable 
mediators employed by multilateral institutions and NGOs to pursue peace.  Moreover, flexible funding 
mechanisms that can rapidly disburse funds are important for covering logistical and transportation 
costs for actors across conflict divides to meet and can also support confidence-building measures.
•	 Inclusive Processes: The involvement of civic actors can be critical at the level of mediation.8  In the 
case of Galkaio, civic actors and civic activists, most notably women but also youth, were able to keep 
the momentum of the process, pressuring actors and shaping an agreement whose benefits could be 
more widely enjoyed by the community. 
8  We suggest a slight difference between a civic actor and a civic activist, where the former is a civic-minded, unarmed actor, con-
cerned about the public interest but not necessarily an activist, whereas the latter represents a more pro-active personal commitment and en-
gagement in or to a cause. Across the CRP we are exploring the notion of ‘civicness’, as a logic of public authority that we contrast with identity 
politics and the political marketplace, see: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2019/05/22/kaldor-civicness/ 
This policy brief is part of the CRP theme on Local Agreements.
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